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Just Caring
An Experiment in Health Policy Formation 
Leonard M. Fleck
Michigan State University
Over the past three years or so, a movement has gradually developed 
that is described as the "Health Decisions" movement. It refers to 
statewide, grass roots efforts aimed at stimulating health policy discus 
sions at the community level about many of the more controversial and 
morally troubling aspects of health policy in the United States. This 
is an important social and political phenomenon for four reasons. First, 
these projects have attempted not to be just another special interest group 
in the state. Rather, they have aimed, through public conversation, to 
identify common purposes in health decisions. In analyzing these proj 
ects, Bruce Jennings writes that "they have taken pains to avoid polariz 
ing the issues with which they deal. Their objective is to provide a new 
space for moral and political discourse. This is the space of the 
democratic forum, where groups that usually confront one another in 
an adversarial fashion can bracket their differences, at least for a while, 
and search for common objectives and some common ground. The 
guiding metaphor of these projects is conversation, not confrontation; 
and their spirit of advocacy is tempered by one of open and tolerant 
inquiry" (Jennings 1988, p. 9). This attitude of open and tolerant in 
quiry should be seen as motivating the project I describe later in this 
essay.
Second, these projects help to disabuse us of the false belief that our 
moral concerns and moral conflicts are purely matters of private con 
science to be worked out however we wish within that personal inner 
sanctum. This is especially true when the moral value with which we 
are concerned is that of justice. If justice exists anywhere, it must exist 
as a feature of our social policies and practices, not our private con 
sciences. As the philosopher John Rawls observes, "Justice is the first
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virtue of social institutions, as truth is of systems of thought" (Rawls 
1971, p. 3). Just as truth must be an object of public inquiry through 
the methods of science, so also justice must be an object of rational 
public inquiry. The difference is that we have had good models of how 
science ought to be carried on for the past 400 years. We have had few 
good models of how public moral inquiry might be done, though the 
objective of these projects is to create such models.
Third, these projects are important because they reinforce the idea 
that profoundly moral issues in our public life ought not to be left to 
political and moral experts, much less managerial, organizational, or 
economic experts. As Daniel Callahan has noted, there is a strong temp 
tation in our society to treat the problems of health care financing, health 
care cost containment, and health care rationing as exclusively economic 
and organizational issues, ignoring entirely the moral dimensions of 
these issues (Callahan 1990, p. 27). There are reasons why this hap 
pens, but they are not good reasons. The issues that need to be addressed 
are potentially painful and divisive. Health policy options that require 
us to consider who lives, who dies, and how much we as a society are 
willing to spend to save or prolong a life are difficult choices. Our social 
life will be much more pleasant if we can continue to affirm the social 
illusion that human life is priceless. And, of course, we can get away 
with just that if we give authority to economic experts to make these 
choices in think tanks safely sequestered from public view. However, 
making appropriate decisions in these matters is a moral responsibility 
that each and every citizen has; and hence, a good democratic society 
will provide democratic forums and decisionmaking structures that will 
facilitate the carrying out of that responsibility by its citizens, even though 
the matters to be discussed are painful and divisive. The fact is that 
health policy decisions do affect all of us, not just economically, but 
in profoundly moral ways. The choices we make with respect to health 
policy reflect very concretely the extent to which we are a just and car 
ing community in practice. Symbolic social affirmations of the 
pricelessness of human life that mask discriminatory rationing decisions 
privately effected are both dishonest and unjust.
Fourth, if there are limits to what we can and ought to spend on health 
care as a social good, and if the factors that have precipitated escalating
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health care costs over the past 20 years are going to continue unabated 
and even intensified for the foreseeable future, then we will have to 
accept the conclusion of most health economists that rationing access 
to health care is inescapable (Fuchs 1974, chap. 1; Thurow 1985, pp. 
611-14; Schwartz 1987, pp. 220-24). But, I would argue, we ought 
not accept the conclusion, advocated by some, 1 that such rationing be 
effected by institutional mechanisms that are private and invisible, hid 
den from public scrutiny. I have argued elsewhere that such invisible 
rationing mechanisms are presumptively unjust. 2 Just rationing policies 
can be effected publicly. Again, the virtue of the Health Decisions move 
ment is that it has provided us with models of how such public conver 
sations can be productively carried on. It has helped to make these 
choices visible, painful and tragic though they be.
Though the state projects that have come under the rubric of the Health 
Decisions movement have had much to recommend them, there has been 
one major shortcoming. It is that most of these projects have been 
organized around discrete public forums and workshops that have at 
tempted to address "the" problem of escalating health care costs and 
equitable access to health care. In point of fact, however, there are at 
least 20 large problems that can and ought to be distinguished within 
this policy domain. What virtually everyone who is familiar with this 
problem domain concedes is that multiple, conflicting social and moral 
values are at stake, and that tradeoffs need to be made. This last point 
is something that the larger public will never achieve an adequate ap 
preciation of, so long as their exposure to these issues is in discrete 
chunks. More sustained and comprehensive public conversations that 
span months and years are needed to bring about that level of public 
understanding. What we describe below is a project that represents one 
model of how that might be done.
In these introductory remarks, I have made what some would regard 
as debatable assertions which really are in need of intellectual justifica 
tion, since they ground the practical need for the project I describe. 
One such proposition is that health care ought to be thought of as a 
social good or public good rather than simply a private consumer good 
that is properly distributed according to individual ability to pay. This 
proposition is needed to support the moral claim that there are matters of
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justice that need to be addressed as part of our choice of health care 
policies. My second claim is that there are multiple moral problems 
connected with justice and health policy that need to be addressed and 
that require, for their resolution, value tradeoffs. During the 1970s, 
philosophers seemed to think there was really only one moral issue here, 
namely, whether or not there was something called a right to health 
care. Anyone familiar with health policy today in its concrete details 
would see that as a wholly inadequate moral framing of our problem. 
In the first part of this essay, I attempt to provide a sketch of an in 
tellectual justification for these claims. In the second part, I describe 
a model for a statewide project that would address, through public con 
versation, the moral issues that are integral to our health policy choices 
at both the state and national levels.
Health Care Justice 
Who Lives? Who Pays? Who Cares?
The current climate in health care is dominated by multiple demands 
for health care cost containment. These demands come from both the 
public and private sectors. The statistics cited most often to portray the 
problem are the following: In 1990, it is estimated that we in the United 
States spent about $660 billion on health care, which represented about 
12.2 percent of our Gross National Product (GNP). By way of com 
parison, in 1960 we spent $26 billion on health care, which represented 
5.2 percent of GNP then. While the dollar figures are very large, what 
is most distressing to economists and policymakers is that the fraction 
of GNP devoted to health care has more than doubled. Worse still, there 
are few signs in the foreseeable future that escalating health costs will 
flatten out. Over the past 20 years, health costs have escalated at roughly 
twice the rate of inflation as measured by the Consumer Price Index, 
and this has remained true through a major recession during the 1980s 
and assorted stringent efforts at health care cost containment. Again, 
by way of comparison, Great Britain spent about 6.4 percent of its GNP 
on health care in 1989, while Canada spent about 8.7 percent of its GNP. 
The implication here is that it is possible to spend less on health care;
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and, at least in the case of Canada, to have a health care system equal 
in quality to what we have in the United States (Evans 1986; Evans 
et al. 1989).
If health care were purchased as a private consumer good, as are all 
sorts of other consumer goods, then all of the above statistics would 
have little practical import. For they would simply reflect in aggregated 
form hundreds of millions of individual consumer decisions to purchase 
health care rather than something else. However, we do not treat health 
care as a private good. Rather, since the 1930s we have treated it as 
a social good, which is purchased primarily through an insurance 
mechanism, either in the private sector or the public sector. No one 
doubts that health insurance represents a rational social response to the 
personal tragedy of serious illness and hospitalization. For the fact is 
that the occurrence of illness for any individual is mostly unpredictable. 
Further, in the case of serious illness, there will usually be high costs 
associated with either cure or relief of the illness, costs that few people 
would be prepared to meet. It was no coincidence that effective health 
care and health insurance emerged about the same time. What we mean 
by "effective" health care are interventions that saved lives, prolong 
ed lives, and relieved serious suffering. These are goods to which all 
of us want and need secure access, most especially when we are ill. 
Health insurance represents one sort of appropriate social response to 
that need.
While there may be much that individuals can do to forestall the oc 
currence of many diseases, there is relatively little that individuals can 
do as individuals in response to serious disease once they have been 
afflicted with that disease. Again, a rational approach to this problem 
is to devise appropriate social responses. Thus, the bulk of medical 
research and medical education are publicly funded. Physicians have 
the healing powers they have because a large social investment has been 
made in them. Moreover, public dollars have built most of the hospitals 
and paid for most of the technology that makes our health care system 
effective. As a society, we have even facilitated the purchase of health 
insurance by exempting that benefit from income and social security 
taxes, which represented a $48 billion subsidy to the middle class and 
$48 billion in revenue forgone by the federal government in 1990. It
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would be very difficult to justify this kind of subsidy, either morally 
or politically, if what were being publicly subsidized were simply private 
expenditures by the middle class.
Everything said thus far may be taken as so much stage setting for 
our primary claim, namely, that there are profound moral issues that 
must be addressed as we make appropriate health policy decisions. For 
example, in arguing that health care represents a social good in our 
society, what we are implying is that there are important matters of 
justice pertaining to how this good is distributed, which would not be 
the case if it were merely another private consumer good. Thus, no 
one objects to the fact that a unique Picasso painting is sold to the highest 
bidder, but virtually everyone in our society would be morally outraged 
if human hearts or livers for transplant purposes were literally auction 
ed off to the highest bidder. This seems like a solid moral intuition on 
which there is widespread agreement. But it does not seem to take us 
very far. If the wealthiest individual with a failing heart or liver has 
no special moral claim to that organ, who does and who is to decide?
We often think of our society as being meritocratic, which suggests 
that there are always some individuals who are "more deserving" than 
others. This makes sense when we are thinking about rewarding in 
dividuals for a job well done with a promotion or pay raise. But how 
would such notions apply when we are distributing transplant organs, 
which literally will make the difference between life and death. Some 
may be tempted to suggest that there are individuals who have contributed 
more to society than others; but certainly this is the sort of claim that 
could be open to interminable dispute about how we would judge and 
compare an indefinite variety of incommensurable social contributions. 
Moreover, many would feel that there was something morally inap 
propriate and incommensurate in "rewarding" some productive in 
dividuals with life while consigning others who were a bit less produc 
tive to death.
For those who are inclined to some sort of egalitarian conception of 
justice, it might seem that because we all have an equal right to life, 
all who need that organ transplant should at least have an equal chance 
to get it. This idea has considerable moral appeal. However, the Pitts 
burgh transplant surgeon Starzl drew significant criticism when he did
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a liver transplant in 1987 on a 76-year old woman (Koenig 1986). After 
all, he could have saved more life-years at a lower cost per life-year 
if a younger patient had received that transplant. This erodes a bit of 
our confidence in the egalitarian ideal. Then, of course, there are all 
those patients whose livers or hearts are failing because of their own 
bad health habits, i.e., an alcoholism problem, or cigarette smoking, 
or poorly managed stress, etc. Many would feel it is unfair if these in 
dividuals have an equal claim to a transplant organ when others have 
done nothing to bring an organ-destroying illness upon themselves. Most 
recently, the question was raised of whether individuals who are sero- 
positive for the AIDS virus should have an equal right of access to an 
organ transplant. It needs to be noted that such individuals will more 
than likely go on to have the full-blown version of AIDS, from which 
they will die. However, it could be as long as 10 years before the disease 
actually manifests itself. In the meantime, this individual has an im 
mediate need for that life-preserving organ transplant.
Nothing said here is meant to suggest there is any easy or obvious 
answer to these moral problems. There are conflicting intuitions of justice 
in these cases that pull us (both as individuals and as a society) in various 
directions. To make matters even more difficult, we need to note that 
justice is not the only moral value at stake. Many in our society would 
assert the equal moral importance of affirming the "pricelessness of 
human life." This value represented "cheap and easy" morality when 
there was relatively little that medicine could do to prolong human lives 
afflicted with life-threatening disease. But in an era of rapidly pro 
liferating, expensive, life-prolonging medical technologies, sustaining 
this value is neither cheap nor easy. And in the real world it often 
represents a threat to our commitment to justice.
A clear example of how the pricelessness ideal threatens justice is 
to be found in the Cruzan case in Missouri. Nancy Cruzan was a 25-year 
old woman in 1983 who was involved in an automobile accident that 
resulted in her being reduced to a persistent vegetative state for the next 
seven years. She was sustained in this unconscious state via tube 
feedings, which her parents asked to have discontinued so that she be 
allowed to die. Virtually all of the attention of the public and the courts 
was focused on the issue of whether surrogate decisionmakers have the
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moral right to choose death for an incompetent patient. But what was 
ignored was the equally significant moral issue raised by the fact that 
the State of Missouri was paying $130,000 per year through Medicaid 
to sustain Nancy Cruzan in that unconscious state, this in keeping with 
its recently enacted "right-to-life" constitutional amendment. What 
makes this a significant issue of justice is that the Missouri Medicaid 
program covers only 40 percent of those below the poverty level, and 
clearly those other 60 percent could benefit much more from secure 
access to health care than Nancy Cruzan. 3
But even if we ignore for a moment these conflicts between justice 
and the pricelessness ideal, there are substantial difficulties in inter 
preting what that ideal itself is supposed to mean practically. One way 
of interpreting what is meant by the pricelessness of human life is to 
say that a good society will not allow people to die who cannot afford 
the successful but expensive medical technology that might save and 
prolong their lives. Our commitment to this belief is most clearly il 
lustrated by the 1972 Medicare amendments that underwrote the cost 
of dialysis for all those with renal failure. (Prior to those amendments 
the cost of dialysis, at $30,000 per year in 1968, was a real barrier 
to access for the vast majority of patients in that condition. Further, 
there was only one dialysis slot available for every ten patients who 
needed a slot for survival.) As a result of those Medicare amendments, 
there are 95,000 people alive today who owe their life to that program. 
But the cost of that program to Medicare in 1988 was about $2.8 billion. 
Further, Congress has, of late, strongly resisted any effort to create 
a similar program that would underwrite the costs of organ transplants, 
now with a much higher success rate as a result of the introduction of 
(expensive) immuno-suppressive drugs such as cyclosporine. Major 
transplant surgery generally carries front-end costs of $100,000 to 
$150,000 per case. What should we conclude from this lack of political 
enthusiasm? Do we value human life less now? That is, do we no longer 
think human life is priceless? If so, should we be subjected to moral 
criticism? What does justice require in these circumstances so far as 
our health policy is concerned? Are we treating those in need of organ 
transplants unfairly, since we refuse to provide public funding for these 
procedures, especially when we consider that those in need of organ
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transplants have paid taxes to fund renal dialysis? And what are we to 
conclude, morally speaking, about the fact that we do fund kidney 
transplants through the End-Stage Renal Dialysis (ESRD) amendments, 
but not other organ transplants?
It was announced in October 1987 that the federal government had 
awarded the University of Utah a $10 million grant over a five-year 
period to finish the development of a totally implantable artificial heart 
(TIAH). Unlike the artificial heart that sustained Barney Clark for several 
months, this heart would not require a 300-pound power source out 
side the individual. Its power source would be wholly self-contained. 
On the assumption that this project is successful, how should we res 
pond from a moral perspective? Such a device might be able to pro 
long the lives of more than a hundred thousand people each year who 
are in the end stages of heart disease. But the cost of implanting that 
device in all those people would be more than $12 billion per year, 
unless we were able to agree upon some set of criteria for rationing 
access to that device. Here we need to keep in mind that an advantage 
of the limited supply of natural hearts for transplant purposes is that 
we cannot escape the need to make rationing decisions. But if we ar 
bitrarily limit the number of artificial heart transplants for political or 
economic reasons, then we will be saying publicly that there are some 
lives that we judge are not worth saving, even though we have the 
technology available that could save those lives. That would represent 
a public repudiation of the widely held belief that human life should 
be thought of as being priceless. Further, there would be intense public 
conflict over what represented a truly just distribution of the artificial 
hearts that were available. At the moment, the choice is still theoretically 
available to us as to whether or not we ought to fund such technologies. 
Would we be unjust as a society if we were to choose not to fund that 
technology?
It would be a mistake to think that the problems we are sketching 
here pertain primarily to organ transplants. The larger issue pertains 
to what our societal response ought to be to the occurrence of catastropic 
illness. As the health economist, Victor Fuchs, points out, health in 
surance was originally designed to protect all of us from financial ruin 
by spreading out the risk associated with costly catastrophic illness.
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The assumption behind such insurance is that relatively few people would 
be so afflicted. However, given the continued advances in life-prolonging 
technology of all sorts, the likelihood is that the vast majority of us 
will be afflicted with one or more costly episodes of catastrophic ill 
ness. That threatens to undermine the whole point of health insurance. 
The response of insurance companies, as they seek to protect their own 
interests and those of their clients, has been to increase their vigilance 
in identifying before the fact individuals who are most likely to suffer 
such catastrophic illnesses. The best current example would be in 
dividuals who are sero-positive for the AIDS virus. Those individuals 
are then denied insurance, which will mean that they will ultimately 
be denied needed health care. 4
The average heterosexual reader should take small comfort in know 
ing this because, as more tests are developed to identify individuals who 
are genetically predisposed from birth for certain illnesses, those in 
dividuals too will be excluded from insurance pools. It is easy enough 
to understand the reasoning of insurers in these matters: they will argue 
that they are not a welfare system, but a mechanism for distributing 
risk. Still, the net result will be that those who are most in need of health 
care will most likely be denied access to the health care that they need. 
This result seems neither just nor humane. But it is clear that this is 
the direction in which we are moving. Further, where we could once 
expect that community hospitals would care for these patients as chari 
ty care, that is becoming increasingly less true. Hospitals find themselves 
under intense pressure from purchasers of their services to give dis 
counts, and that effectively eliminates the financial cushion that per 
mitted hospitals in the past to provide charity care.
There are numerous other moral issues that could be fleshed out at 
this point, but for which space allows only brief allusions. The likelihood 
of needing a major organ transplant is, I take it, a small probability 
event for most of my readers. This might undermine my claim that there 
are issues here that must be addressed by all citizens in our society. 
However, I would judge that all my readers confidently expect to grow 
old. The care of the elderly certainly represents a focal point of much 
moral and health policy attention. The chief reason for this is that the 
elderly are disproportionately recipients of health resources in our soci-
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ety. Though the elderly represent only 12 percent of the current popula 
tion in the United States, they are responsible for consuming about 34 
percent of all health resources. The twofold emerging problem is that 
as the post World War II "baby boom" generation ages out, the frac 
tion of this high health care consumption group will grow significant 
ly. Roughly 20 percent of our total population will be elderly in the 
year 2030, about 62 million people. Further, this problem might be 
economically manageable if the relative level of health needs per per 
son remained constant into the indefinite future. However, continuing 
advances in medical technology promise that the health "needs" of this 
generation will continue to grow dramatically as the elderly live longer 
and have more chronic health problems for which there will be an in 
creasing number of costly ameliorative interventions.
Given this likely scenario, should we as a society adopt the recom 
mendations of Daniel Callahan and others to identify an age (such as 
80) beyond which the elderly would be denied expensive life-prolonging 
interventions?5 Or would such a policy be morally objectionable as a 
form of discrimination comparable to racism and sexism? And what 
about human growth hormone for the elderly? Recent research suggests 
that it will improve muscle mass and quality of life for the elderly but 
at a cost of $13,700 per year per person? (Rudman et al. 1990; Vance 
1990). Should Medicare cover those costs? Would it be fair for the public 
to cover those costs even though there are 37 million Americans without 
any health insurance at all? And if we are concerned about fair treat 
ment of the elderly and equal moral respect for them, then what are 
we to conclude about the fact that the Medicare program is a uniform 
national program, while the benefit package and eligibility levels for 
Medicaid vary substantially from state to state? Relative to the poor 
under Medicaid, are the elderly being treated more than fairly, with 
something more than equal respect? The very asking of this question 
seems insensitive in the light of great unmet health needs of the elderly 
in our society, especially their needs for long-term care, home care, 
and a broad range of social support services. But that only serves to 
emphasize our larger point: there are real resource limits regarding health 
care. These limits become painfully evident with every advance in 
medical technology.
244 Just Caring
Everything said above may be taken as a very compact sketch of some 
major problems faced by our health care system today. The conclu 
sions we would wish to draw from this sketch are the following. First, 
we cannot escape the need to make choices that will involve rationing 
access to health care, especially expensive life-prolonging forms of health 
care. The simple fact that economists properly emphasize is that 
resources are always scarce relative to wants and needs. Second, the 
problem of rationing is not merely a technical problem to be resolved 
by economic experts. It is at bottom a moral and political problem, the 
sort of problem that benefits from the knowledge and advice of experts, 
but that ultimately must be resolved through the processes of democratic 
decisionmaking. Third, to improve as much as possible the quality of 
those democratic decisionmaking processes, it is imperative that there 
be a broad public conversation of the moral issues that are involved 
and the policy options that are available to us. Fourth, we are not talk 
ing about a single problem that can be easily captured by a single phrase, 
such as the problem of health care cost containment. This problem spills 
over and affects a large number of health policy questions, all of which 
have to be addressed in a comprehensive fashion. What this suggests 
is the need for public policy conversations among members of the 
educated public that are sustained and coherent and well informed. Fifth, 
the most important moral notion that should serve as a focal point for 
such conversations is the notion of justice. What we need to formulate 
as a society are just health care policies that will sustain a just health 
care system. Sixth, we operate with conflicting conceptions of justice 
in our society, which are often poorly articulated in public forums. We 
need to improve our articulateness in thinking through our conception 
of justice.
Seventh, we have no reason to believe there is only one just health 
policy that somehow all truly rational citizens would agree upon. It is 
highly improbable that such would be the case. Having conceded that, 
we do not have to concede that it is impossible to make any moral prog 
ress in moving toward more just health policies, for we ought to achieve 
considerable agreement about those policies or practices in health care 
that are clearly unjust. If we can accomplish that much through our 
public conversations, we should regard that as a major achievement. 6
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Just Caring 
Health Policy for the 1990s
In the remainder of this essay, I describe a project that we have pro 
posed in Michigan, offering one model of how a socio-moral conver 
sation regarding health care policy might be carried on that is rational 
and respectful of our liberal democratic political traditions. It is more 
complex than any of the other projects that have been part of the Health 
Decisions movement, but I would argue this is what the policy area 
itself requires.
Project Goals and Objectives
There have been two projects in the United States that have gotten 
a fair amount of national visibility and that provide a useful reference 
point for the proper design of this project. Both were citizen-based rather 
than expert-based projects. One was the "Oregon project," 7 a three- 
year project that covered the State of Oregon. It involved over 300 grass 
roots community meetings to identify what citizens in general took to 
be important moral and public policy issues with respect to health care. 
Those meetings took place in almost that number of communities. The 
information gathered from those meetings was fed into a citizen's health 
parliament, which distilled a number of broad principles regarding the 
just distribution of health care resources from those meetings. The prob 
lem with this approach is its superficiality at the grass roots level. The 
grass roots meetings were more like gripe sessions and less like public 
moral conversations in which citizens would have to struggle with making 
difficult tradeoffs. That kind of conversation was restricted to the 
parliamentary representatives.
The other noteworthy project was from Minnesota. It involved a 
distinguished, broadly representative task force of community leaders 
and health care providers who sought to articulate principles for the 
just distribution of scarce life-saving medical technologies, especially 
organ transplants. This project required more in the way of public con 
versation by project participants, but the range of issues considered was 
too restricted, given the real range of tradeoffs that ought to be addressed
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within the health care field. Still, both these projects provide us with 
important guidance. Specifically, they suggest the importance of a proj 
ect's being statewide in scope. That helps to give a project visibility 
and will help to generate commitment since the project is likely to make 
a difference in the real world. Next, the project should cover a broad 
range of issues pertaining to justice and health care policy. There is 
something that is morally deceptive about taking a piecemeal incremen- 
talist approach to these matters. Finally, the project ought to involve 
(at least as observers who have an opportunity to question and challenge) 
as broad a segment of the public as possible.
With the above suggestions in mind, I offer the following as project 
objectives:
1. To create public forums in which health care professionals and 
thoughtful citizens can engage in a sustained and systematic discussion 
of critical moral issues raised by changes in health care technology, 
health care delivery, health care financing, and health care policy.
2. To raise the overall level of awareness and understanding of these 
moral issues throughout the state through the judicious use of local 
newspapers and television, recognizing that only a limited number of 
people can participate in the face-to-face conversations envisioned under 
objective 1.
3. To identify and assess from a predominantly moral perspective 
policy options at the institutional, community, state, and national levels 
regarding moral issues raised by changes in health care technology, 
financing, and delivery mechanisms.
4. To identify as clearly and precisely as possible those "considered 
moral judgments" of justice that the philosopher John Rawls (1971) 
refers to as the shared starting points for moral conversations that ad 
dress more controversial moral issues, the assumption being that this 
is an effective method for reaching some expanded level of agreement 
with respect to these controversial issues (pp. 19-20, 47-53).
5. To develop a richly nuanced and realistic moral conversation at 
the state and community levels, one that is both sensitive to the political, 
economic, and institutional constraints that make "perfect justice" im 
possible, and that balances what are sometimes several legitimate moral 
values that conflict with one another.
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6. To create institutionalized state and community linkages that will 
assure the sustaining of this conversation after the project has been com 
pleted, in particular, linkages between an informed lay public and in 
stitutional providers of health care.
Project Design
Our best judgment is that a project of the sort we have in mind might 
require three years to complete, probably three years for project plan 
ners and two years for project citizen participants. In order to cover 
a state such as Michigan in some fashion, there should be 15 to 20 proj 
ect sites, probably located in larger urban areas. (Using Michigan as 
an example, there might have to be 5 project sites in metropolitan Detroit, 
given the density of the population. Other sites could include Ann Ar 
bor, Battle Creek, Kalamazoo, Flint, Lansing, Grand Rapids, Saginaw, 
Midland, Mt. Pleasant, Escanaba, Marquette, Traverse City area, Benton 
Harbor-St. Joseph area, Petoskey area, Grayling area. For reasons listed 
below, easy access to a community college, private college, 
or university is one criterion that should determine choice of sites.)
We envision four stages for a project. The first stage is for detailed 
project planning. The second stage would be the problem identification/ 
seminar stage. The third stage would be a problem response/activity 
stage. The fourth stage would involve a summative project conference 
whose primary objective would be to articulate both a shared vision 
of what our health policy ought to be and a strategy for getting from 
here to there. Stages one and four would take place at some central 
location. Stage one really requires the resources of a large university 
or a consortium thereof. Stage four requires the visibility of the state 
capitol. Ideally, stage four would involve a formal engagement with 
the state legislature and representatives from the executive branch of 
government. Stages two and three would take place in the various proj 
ect communities, though there would be substantial centralized coor 
dination and resource provision from the university that served as an 
administrative home for the project.
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Stage One: Planning and Organization
1. Identify project board and core staff
The project needs a large Board that will be broadly representative 
of the different interests and constituencies affected by changes in health 
policy. Part of the role of the Board is to give visibility and legitimacy 
to the project. The role of the Board is not to "protect interests," but 
to show that fruitful moral conversation is possible among individuals 
with diverse interests. That means that the Board itself must be com 
mitted to rational "neutral conversation," 8 as opposed to partisan or 
ideological conversation. That also means that the capacity for and com 
mitment to critical analysis must be an integral part of that conversa 
tion. To help achieve that ideal, it is necessary that there be 10 or so 
academics from diverse disciplinary backgrounds who will assist the 
Board (as well as project participants at various sites) in developing 
and using those critical skills. In addition, some core staff will be needed 
to coordinate and support project activities at the various project sites. 
This would include the development and dissemination of materials need 
ed at the various project sites. The importance of this last task should 
not be underestimated. It takes a lot of creative thinking to design educa 
tional materials that will effectively stimulate and focus those community 
conversations.
2. Identify broad plan of project activities
It would be very surprising if the project proposed here is simply 
adopted by any project Board. We assume that there will be further 
discussion and revision regarding both the broad design of a project 
such as this, and the definition of project goals and objectives. Project 
sites would also have to be identified. It is obviously desirable that 
population centers be covered, though somewhat rural areas cannot be 
justifiably ignored since there are important health policy issues unique 
to that setting. A project such as this needs academic talent at the local 
level for the reasons cited above, so easy access to such talent ought 
to be a consideration. Also to be considered are local hospitals who 
have a Board and/or hospital ethics committee with a serious interest 
in the goals and objectives of this project. The Goshen project
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that I directed (which was the small-scale forerunner of this larger sort 
of project I describe here) was successful because both the Board and 
the Ethics committee of Goshen General Hospital were intensely com 
mitted to the project. 9 An entity that could facilitate access to such in 
stitutions in Michigan would be the Medical Ethics Resource Network 
of Michigan, which is based at Michigan State University, and which 
links together hospital ethics committees throughout the state. There 
are at least 15 such networks of hospital ethics committees in other states, 
which would be seen as an important resource for a project such as 
this, in part because they will ultimately have responsibility for ar 
ticulating rationing/resource allocation policies at the institutional level.
3. Establish a project budget and raise needed funds 
If I were forced to attach some sort of very crude budget figure to 
the project envisioned here, assuming a total life of three years, I would 
guess at $35,000 per project site, plus about $300,000 for central plan 
ning and administration costs, or about $1 million over a three-year 
period for a 20-site project. This includes a lot of volunteer effort. But 
a project of this complexity cannot rely exclusively on volunteer ef 
fort. There is simply too much effort and responsibility required at each 
local site to ensure the success of the project. As for securing funding, 
it is not unreasonable to pursue state support for this project because 
it does represent a serious state responsibility; and a project such as 
this can facilitate legislative decisionmaking. The fact is that legislators 
are reluctant to undertake any major reforms of health care policy when 
the policy choices themselves are painful and controversial, and when 
no more than a small minority supports any particular reform proposal. 
Other sources of funding include larger foundations in the state and in 
communities where the project is sited.
4. Identify local project directors
A significant commitment of time at the local level would be needed 
to make this project work. I know that very well from personal ex 
perience. Local project directors should be knowledgeable about health 
care policy and some of the moral issues raised by our policy options. 
They should have good facilitative and organizational skills, and should
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feel comfortable working with a highly diverse group of citizens and 
professionals. They should have some experience with community educa 
tion. My own biases would incline me toward academics who are suc 
cessful communicators with a broad professional public, and who are 
competent in fostering and sustaining the neutral conversation that is 
necessary for the success of this project.
5. Identify local planning committees
These local committees should probably have about a dozen or so 
members who are broadly representative of key health care constituen 
cies, much like the project Board. This local committee would 
presumably help with recruiting and identifying individuals who ought 
to be part of the "core seminar groups" in each community. What we 
would want are individuals who have a very serious interest in the moral 
and health policy issues that would be the focus of this project. Work 
ing closely with each of these local planning committees would be a 
mini-academic consortium of three to five individuals who would have 
pertinent academic backgrounds and who would assist with delivering 
project seminars/workshops or other such educational efforts.
6. Hold a planning conference
The planning conference I refer to here would be for, say, five 
representatives from each project site. This might really be more of 
a training conference aimed at making sure that key people at each site 
understood the goals/objectives of the project, and had some practical 
direction in recruiting individuals for the "core seminar groups" at each 
site. Also, strategies for accessing the media should be discussed, so 
that the project received visibility before a large public and could pro 
duce spinoff educational effects in the larger community. Here in 
Michigan, consortiums of public television stations have worked with 
one another to develop important statewide programs. Similar ar 
rangements are possible in other states. This project seems ideal for 
that kind of cooperative effort. Also, in these training sessions there 
would have to be discussion of mechanisms for stimulating and focus 
ing the conversations that would occur in each of the core seminar 
groups.
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Perhaps the first third of that planning conference ought to be given 
over to laying out the broad range of problems I alluded to in the first 
part of this essay for purposes of establishing some shared sense of vi 
sion and purpose among participants. The last two-thirds of the program 
would be given over to exploring various ways in which the project 
might be implemented at the local level, with special attention given 
to identifying and resolving potential implementation problems. I en 
vision this as a long one-day conference. That may not be a realistic 
time frame.
It might also be very desirable to spend a week in the summer train 
ing those academics who will have the most direct involvement with 
the project seminars at each site. Much of that week might be spent 
modeling, practicing, and testing different ways in which those com 
munity seminars might be run. It is critical that there be genuine con 
versation among seminar participants (as opposed to a series of ques 
tions directed to faculty facilitators), and that these conversations be 
focused and directed.
7. Develop educational resources needed locally
The second stage of the project, what I shall refer to as the community 
seminar stage, is modeled on the Goshen project that I directed. The 
central premise of that project was that successful community discus 
sion of issues of justice and health care policy required community con 
versations that had depth, that were comprehensive, that were well 
organized, and that were sustained over a period of time. In order to 
achieve that objective, considerable resources had to be developed in 
that project, such as newspaper essays, very detailed leader's guides 
for community seminars, reading materials for each seminar, guides 
for the work of project task forces, and so on. This required a lot of 
tune and energy, but it certainly resulted in community discussions that 
were much more focused and productive. If that same effort were re 
quired of each project director at the local level, I doubt very many 
would be interested in attempting the project. Or else project costs would 
escalate enormously. Consequently, my recommendation is that the 
educational/publicity resources needed for the project be developed in 
a centralized way. I can guarantee that this will not produce carbon copy
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conversations at each site, but will instead facilitate greatly the ease 
with which such conversations can be initiated.
My suggestion is that for each seminar/workshop there ought to be 
four to six articles that are required reading for each member of the 
core seminar group, about 40-50 pages. The sort of articles I have in 
mind are those that discuss issues of ethics and health policy in profes 
sional health care journals, or in publications such as The Hastings Center 
Report. Such articles are generally not excessively academic and 
opaque. 10 Those articles should be as balanced as possible in terms of 
reflecting alternative points of view on these policy issues, since there 
are many reasonable but conflicting points of view on these matters. 
In the past I also developed leader's guides (four to six typed pages) 
to accompany each packet of articles. The guides focus attention on 
specific issues, assist the reader in reading more carefully and critical 
ly, and articulate a number of issues that can serve as focal points for 
discussion in the seminars themselves. The guides also provide cases 
and exercises for stimulating conversation in the group.
For the project we envision in Michigan, we plan to produce a book- 
length manuscript organized into 20 chapters that will be coordinated 
with each of the community seminars that are planned. Each chapter 
will be a combination of an essay introducing the specific issues that 
will be the focus of that seminar, and a leader's guide geared to the 
readings that project participants will be doing for that session. Like 
the earlier leader's guides, this will also provide specific questions that 
will give focus and direction to each seminar. The larger objective I 
have in mind is developing a resource that will have utility as a stimulus 
for such community conversations elsewhere in the United States.
I also wrote a number of newspaper essays that were published in 
the Goshen paper just prior to each seminar. These served as a way 
of involving a larger public in the project. Such essays could also be 
produced locally for the opinion pages of local papers, depending upon 
the time and commitment of local academics/participants. This is 
something that we strongly encourage, because this is a way of draw 
ing these issues to the attention of a public larger than those who can 
participate in the seminars themselves.
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Stage Two: Project Seminars and Workshops
1. Identify local core seminar groups
I think there ought to be a "core seminar group" in each communi 
ty. This could be anywhere from 25 to 50 people who would be invited 
to be part of the group. About half these people should be connected 
with health care as providers or administrators or insurers. The other 
half ought to be broadly representative of the community at large and 
should themselves be part of the "educated lay public," who under 
stand the importance of reading and are willing to make a commitment 
to do a fair amount of it. When I say "broadly representative" I mean 
those groups who are affected in significant ways by health policies. 
That means both large and small businesses, organized labor, the elderly, 
the poor, disability groups, and so on.
We would want in this core group people who already have some 
sort of knowledge base regarding health care policy and the concerns 
of this project. Members of this core group would commit themselves 
to attending all of the seminars that would be part of this stage of the 
project, and they would also commit themselves to participating in 
whatever activities were part of stage three. They would also commit 
to doing the reading, since this is the key to having an informed com 
munity discussion as opposed to just exchanging prejudices. In the course 
of organizing this project in Michigan, I have discovered that there is 
a surprisingly large number of citizens in our society who are significant 
ly involved in health policy groups of one kind or another. These are 
the sorts of individuals who already have a strong knowledge base in 
the area, who have the requisite energy and interest, and who would 
seem to be the group from which seminar participants are most readily 
recruited. Further, these are the sorts of individuals who will just natural 
ly carry on the project conversation in the larger community long after 
the formal project has concluded.
Each seminar would last two hours. The first half-hour can be given 
to a panel presentation or key speaker, just to get things rolling; the 
rest can be for organized discussion emerging from the readings, the 
leader guide, or suggested exercises. The public at large should be in 
vited to attend all these sessions, but they are there primarily as observers
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because, presumably, they will not have invested the time and energy 
in reading and reflection that members of the seminar group proper will 
have done. This is not intended to be antidemocratic. Rather, the prac 
tical objective is to create a sense of identity and cohesiveness among 
members of the seminar group proper. My experience shows that this 
is necessary in order to facilitate the conversational process in the group 
itself. That is, group members begin to develop a sense of where other 
seminar members are coming from, which is important for achieving 
a certain level of psychological comfort necessary for candor. It needs 
to be kept in mind that the issues to be addressed are both intellectually 
difficult and emotionally charged.
2. Seminar topics
The same topics should be chosen for all the community seminars. 
Common topics are essential to preserve the statewide nature of this 
moral and public policy conversation. My recommendation would be 
that there should be two series of seminars, perhaps 10 weeks for the 
first set and 8 weeks for the second, with either a winter or summer 
break, depending upon how they are scheduled. The first series of 
seminars would serve as an introduction to the major areas of current 
health policy attention, including the relevant issues of justice, with one 
seminar focusing on each area. The second series would focus on univer 
sal health insurance proposals, or, more generally, proposals aimed at 
restructuring the way in which we finance health care in America. This 
latter focus seems to be dictated by emerging policy debates, reflected 
both in congressional deliberations and in discussions in professional 
health journals. Though that is a national issue, the issue at the state 
level that has precipitated that debate is the issue of what ought to be 
done about the growing number of uninsured in our society, a highly 
heterogeneous mix whose needs are not readily met by current health 
financing options.
I am not quite sure how this second series ought to be organized. 
There are at least eight major credible universal health insurance pro 
posals on the agenda now. Maybe each one of them ought to be a focus 
of a seminar, the object of which would be to assess each one from 
the perspective of about a dozen assessment (value) criteria that would
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have been introduced in the first series of seminars. Of course, one of 
the options would be that we do nothing at the national level, that each 
state be left more or less on its own to work out its own policy solutions. 
What I imagine as the lead-off seminar at each site would be what 
I call a "big picture" seminar aimed at giving everyone a sense of the 
range of health policy issues that must be addressed in public forums 
and how these issues are connected with one another. That seminar would 
then be followed by seminars of the sort listed below. Space does not 
permit a complete listing.
  Health Care, Justice, and the Elderly. How might we justifiably 
set limits on the demands that the elderly make on the health care 
system, bearing in mind that all of us aspire to be among the elderly 
some day?
  Health Care, Justice, and the Poor. To what extent as a society 
are we morally obligated to provide for the health care needs of 
the poor, the uninsured, and the underinsured?
  Health Care, Justice, and the Terminally III, Chronically III, and 
Critically III. How can we justifiably limit the demands that these 
very needy individuals make on our health care system? Justice 
may not require doing everything possible, though compassion 
pushes us in that direction. Still, we are rationally disturbed that 
we might spend so much and achieve so little in the way of benefit 
for these individuals. AIDS, of course, fits in under this topic.
  Justice, Health Care Cost Containment, and the Development and 
Dissemination of Expensive Life-Prolonging Technologies. This 
includes technologies such as organ transplants and artificial hearts.
  Justice and the Financing of Health Care in America. Would we 
have a fairer system for financing health care if we adopted some 
version of national health insurance, perhaps something along the 
lines of Canada?
  Justice and Health Care Cost Containment Approaches. Assum 
ing that we really must do something to control escalating health 
care costs, what mix of policies and approaches would be most 
fair, all things considered?
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  Justice, Health Care, and the Good Physician. The fact is that 
70 percent of all health care dollars are allocated as a result of 
physician decisions. That effectively makes the physician the 
gatekeeper to the health care system; and it would imply that he/she 
ought to be primary rationer of health care sources at the level 
of the patient. That, however, conflicts with our traditional ex 
pectation that physicians will be absolutely loyal to the welfare 
of their patients.
Stage Three: Critical Value Inquiry
The primary objective of stage three is to acquaint project participants 
with the broad range of issues we must face more or less simultaneous 
ly with respect to making health care policy choices. This will require 
the making of more systematic, and presumably more thoughtful and 
more fair, tradeoffs among competing moral and social values. In my 
mind, the primary objective of stage three is to actually make an effort 
to work out some set of tradeoffs, and to make explicit the principles 
and value commitments that govern the choices made. There are really 
two tasks that need to be undertaken here. The first of these should 
be the "value inquiry/value tradeoff task described below. The sec 
ond should be a working paper in which participants apply the results 
of their value inquiry to the task of articulating both a state-based and 
a national policy regarding access to health care. Presumably, this sec 
ond task should be the natural outcome of the second set of seminars 
that had focused on the issue of universal access/universal health 
insurance.
1. Value inquiry/value tradeoff exercise
The value exercise I would recommend is based upon something called 
the "Delphi technique." We start by imagining that as a society we 
want to commit no more than 12 percent of GNP to health care, which 
was a little over $660 billion in 1990. Then everyone is individually 
given a survey form with 70-90 budget items for health care that might 
be described in some detail. We might ask, for example, whether we 
should continue to spend $1.5 billion per year to sustain the 10,000
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people who are in a persistent vegetative state, just like Nancy Cruzan. 
Or do we wish to make available 40,000 totally implantable artificial 
hearts for those under the age of 65 at a cost of $6 billion per year? 
Or would we be willing to spend $15 billion to make up to 100,000 
implants per year available to all who have the relevant medical need 
regardless of age? Individuals would make their choices among the 
possibilities up to the specified budget limit. There could easily be $1 
trillion worth of choices, which means a large portion of our health 
wants/ needs would not be funded. To simplify tabulating, we could 
use a computer score sheet. We would also ask these individuals (the 
seminar participants) to list the moral principles or other social values 
they used in making each of their choices. Again, it might be possible 
to provide a list of 30-50 such "value justification statements" that some 
one might choose from. Individuals would be asked to make a copy 
of their choices for their own records.
All of these surveys would be tabulated at some central site. Par 
ticipants would then get two sets of aggregated results. One set would 
be their local aggregated results, the other would be the statewide results. 
Seminar participants would then get together to discuss these results 
among themselves, perhaps for three sessions of two hours each. They 
could "make a case" for affirming or rejecting whatever the aggregated 
results were on each item. After this discussion takes place, the same 
survey is once again filled out by all, and the results are once again 
aggregated to see what sorts of changes take place as a result of the 
group interaction and assessment. If people are willing to commit the 
time, then this second round of aggregated results should be discussed 
and assessed by the group, after which the survey is completed a third 
time.
Throughout this exercise it is important to keep in mind two things. 
First, the objective is not to achieve some sort of agreement on a societal 
health budget as such. Rather, the objective is to use this budgetary 
exercise as an effective way to explore the moral and social values in 
dividuals believe ought to serve as a basis for making fair and efficient 
allocations of health care resources. Second, there is nothing morally 
commendable about one group in society making rationing decisions 
that will affect the lives and welfare of another group. Hence, it is very
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important that this exercise be structured in such a way that it is clearly 
recognized that we are making rationing choices for ourselves and our 
loved ones. There is a real world circumstance that we ought to be fac 
ing up to now, namely, that the post World War n "baby boom" genera 
tion is aging out and will make enormous demands on the health care 
system starting in the years 2010 through 2035. If we, the members 
of that generation, are unwilling to bear those expenses ourselves, then 
now we ought to begin making the rationing decisions to which we will 
bind ourselves in the future.
2. Critical final paper
As noted above, each core seminar group should apply the results 
of the prior inquiry to the task of articulating a policy proposal related 
to the issue of universal access to health care. Such a paper would reflect 
the discussions of the group from the second set of seminars, as well 
as the results of the value inquiry exercise. This is the product that would 
be brought to the summative conference that would conclude the project.
Stage Four: Summative Conference
This last stage of the project is something that is far from clear in 
my own mind. It has to be the integrative stage of the project. We might 
follow the lead of Oregon and Minnesota in this matter and see this 
summative conference as really a "Health Congress." Each project site 
would then send some limited number of delegates to this congress. 
Their task would be to make some specific health policy recommenda 
tions that would reflect both the results of the third "Delphi" survey 
and the papers that had been prepared at each project site. I was recently 
a participant in a conference that employed a "futures methodology" 
for defining and integrating the views of the professionals and disciplinary 
experts who were part of that conference. It struck me that that approach 
would apply nicely to what we were trying to accomplish here, since 
this approach involved an explicit integration of values, policy choices 
and strategies for effecting those policy options. Another possibility 
is that this "congress" would not just meet on its own. Instead, this 
would be a sort of joint meeting with the state legislature. Again, a key
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objective of such a conference would be to engage legislators in the 
debate rather than to allow them to just listen passively.
From this conference, some sort of public document ought to emerge, 
though this document would not be a "final report." Rather, it would 
serve as a starting point for future public moral conversations about 
the nature of just health care policies and practices. Ultimately, I think 
it would be desirable if we, as a society, could hammer out something 
like a "just health care constitution," a practical document that sought 
to spell out in an explicit and principled way the sort of balances that 
had to be struck among the many competing values and constraints and 
considerations that must shape our health care system and health care 
policy. That requires an even longer and more sustained public con 
versation, but I believe the sort of project proposed here would make 
a good start in that direction.
To conclude, a project of this magnitude, properly organized and 
managed, is likely to have a significant impact in shaping health policy 
at least at the state level, especially if well managed. It should certain 
ly garner significant media attention. And it should serve as a model 
for intelligent public policy debate in other states and for other policy 
areas. One of the things that is assumed is that members of those core 
seminar groups should be chosen because they have the capacity to 
educate and influence their constituents or professional peers. What they 
need to do that effectively are the sorts of resources that would be 
developed through this project.
NOTES
1. The most vocal defenders of invisible rationing are Guido Calabresi and Philip Bobbin in their 
book Tragic Choices. The title of their book nicely captures the core of their basic argument, 
namely, that in matters of health care rationing at the level of social policy, we will always be 
confronted with tragic choices, choices which will necessarily require that we violate some deep 
social value This is because the value conflict is such that to choose one is necessarily to violate 
the other. Hence, their practical recommendation is that to avoid "exposed choices against life" 
and "exposed megalitananism" (and the social rancor that might be precipitated), these choices 
ought to be made through social choice mechanisms, such as markets, that will effectively hide 
the fact that such choices are being made.
2. I have argued against the moral legitimacy of invisible rationing mechanisms in health care 
in two of my articles (Fleck 1987, 1990a).
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3. For a more detailed discussion of this issue, see my article "Pricing Human Life 4 The Moral 
Costs of Medical Progress" (1990b). What has emerged more recently is the case of Helga Wanglie 
in Minneapolis She is an 87-year-old woman who suffered a very severe heart attack in May 
of 1990 that resulted in her being reduced to a persistent vegetative state dependent upon a respirator 
and ICU care. Her husband and two children insist that she herself would have wanted to be sus 
tained in this state indefinitely using all available medical technology. In late 1990, her physi 
cians went to court to ask permission to remove her from the respirator (thereby causing her death) 
because her care was futile, and there was no medical obligation to provide such care. More notewor 
thy, however, is that by June of 1991 her care had cost in excess of $1 million The real issue 
we need to address here as a society is whether anyone in such circumstances has a just claim 
on resources of this magnitude. See Miles (1990).
4. For an excellent discussion of these moral issues, see Daniels (1990).
5. See Callahan, Setting Limits. Medical Goals in an Aging Society (1987) and Daniels, Am I 
My Parents' Keeper 7 An Essay on Justice Between the Young and the Old (1988). These two 
books have sparked an intense debate on the issue of age-rationing. One critical response is Kilner, 
Who Lives? Who Dies? Ethical Criteria in Patient Selection (1990).
6. As noted in the text, I could only present a sketch of the problem of justice as that pertains 
to health care policy in the United States, and I could only sketch a justification for the moral 
claims I advanced. The interested reader may find a more detailed analysis in a paper I prepared 
for the Governor's Task Force on Access to Health Care [Michigan], which has been published 
as part of the final report of that task force. [SeeVolumeS, Background Research Papers, 109-18.] 
The paper is titled "Health Care and the Uninsured Choosing a Just Social Policy.'' The arguments 
for the claim that health care policy is a matter of social justice rather than social beneficence 
may be found in my papers "Just Health Care (I): Is Beneficence Enough?" (1989a) and "Just 
Health Care (II): Is Equality Too Much?" (1989b).
7. See Crawshaw and others, "Oregon Health Decisions An Experiment with Informed Com 
munity Consent" (1985) A more detailed description is available in a project booklet by Brian 
Hines, Oregon and American Health Decisions (Salem, OR: 1985). More recently, Oregon has 
garnered considerable media attention for its effort at priority setting and rationing in the state 
Medicaid program. One of their more controversial tradeoffs would deny organ transplants to 
Medicaid recipients in exchange for expanding the program to cover 100 percent of the poor in 
the state as opposed to the current 58 percent. See the article by the physician who is president 
of the Oregon Senate, John Kitzhaber (1990).
8. This phrase is borrowed from the political philosopher Bruce Ackerman, for whom this is a 
central practical and philosophic notion in his book, Social Justice in the Liberal State (1980). 
9 The Goshen project is very well described in a 30-page project booklet available from Goshen 
General Hospital in Goshen, Indiana. That booklet is titled, Just Caring: Justice, Health Care 
and the Good Society. The project itself was carried out in 1985-87.
10. An excellent example of the sort of essays I have in mind for project seminars are the pieces 
that David Eddy has been doing in JAMA on an occasional basis They are clear, brief, problem- 
focused essays that also suggest alternative ways of thinking about issues of health care rationing 
These essays nicely integrate the moral, political, economic, and organizational dimensions of 
these issues. They all appear under the column heading "Clinical Decision Making: From Theory 
to Practice." The first essay appeared in volume 263 (January 12, 1990) The most recent essay 
appeared in volume 265 (May 8, 1991) There have been 13 essays so far.
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